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Abstract
I argue that wavefunction realism — the view that quantum mechanics
reveals the fundamental ontology of the world to be a field on a high-
dimensional spacetime, must be rejected as (a) relying on artefacts of
too-simple versions of quantum mechanics, and (b) not conceptually well-
motivated even were those too-simple versions exactly correct. I end with
some brief comments on the role of spacetime in any satisfactory account
of the metaphysics of extant quantum theories.
1 Wavefunction realism: the outline case
The outline case for wavefunction realism begins with quantum mechanics, for-
mulated (for N particles) something like the following:
1. The wavefunction of the system, at time t, is a function ψt from the 3N -
fold Cartesian product of the real numbers, R3N , to the complex numbers.
(We can conveniently absorb the time index into the function, so that the
wavefunction assigns a complex number ψ(x1, . . . q3N ; t) to each 3N -tuple
of real numbers and each time t.)
2. The dynamical evolution of the wavefunction (at least when the system is
not being observed) is given by the Schr´’odinger equation,
∂
∂t
ψ = − i
h¯
(
N∑
k=1
h¯2
2mk
∇2kψ + V (q1, . . . , q3N )ψ
)
(1)
where mk is the mass of the kth particle, h¯ is Planck’s constant, and
∇2k is the Laplacian differential operator with respect to the kth triple of
coordinates on R3N .
3. If the positions of the particles are simultaneously observed at time t,
the probability of their 3N position coordinates lying in a small region of
volume δV around the point (q1, . . . , q3N ) is
Pr = |ψ(q1, . . . , q3N )|2δV. (2)
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The third of these premises suggests that ψ ought to be thought of as some sort
of probability distribution or parametrisation of our restricted knowledge, but
a wealth of arguments (beginning with elementary observations about interfer-
ence, and proceeding through formal no-go theorems both classic (Kochen and
Specker 1967; Gleason 1957) and modern (Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph 2011)
make clear that this strategy is not really viable, at least without concessions to
operationalism (Fuchs and Peres 2000; Fuchs 2002) and/or pragmatism (Healey
2012) that philosophers of physics have by and large been loath to make. At
least from a scientific realist’s perspective, it looks as if the quantum state has to
be taken as representational: different quantum states1 represent different ways
the world could be, not simply different levels of human information about the
world.
Wavefunction realism — as advocated originally by Albert (1996) and since
defended by, e. g. , Ney (2013b) and North (2013) (and also by Ney, this volume)
then seems to follow straightforwardly from the formalism: what the wavefunc-
tion is, clearly, is that familiar mathematical object, a field on space, assigning
a value independently to every point in that space. But the space on which
the wavefunction lives is not familiar 3-dimensional space (represented mathe-
matically by R3) but rather 3N -dimensional space (‘configuration space’ as it
is called in physics). And since N is the number of particles in the system —
and since, from a metaphysician’s perspective, ‘the system’ is presumably the
whole universe, even the observable part of which contains ∼ 1080 electrons and
atomic nuclei — this is a space of staggering dimension.
Quantum mechanics, then — says the wavefunction realist — reveals to us
that ordinary space is illusory (Albert 1996) or at any rate non-fundamental
(Ney 2013b). The real space shown to us by physics is wildly different.
The obvious questions raised by this revelation are: (i) why does space appear
to us to be 3-dimensional, and, relatedly, (ii) how do we connect this radical take
on fundamental reality with our observations and so empirically confirm QM?
The pragmatic response to the latter is straightforward, via the probability rule
(3) above: when the wavefunction is peaked around a point in 3N -dimensional
space, we should expect to observe the particles arranged with 3-dimensional
coordinates corresponding to the coordinates of the point at which they are
peaked. (The question of what we should observe when the wavefunction is not
so peaked leads us to the related, but distinct, quantum measurement problem,
which lies outside the scope of this essay.) But that pragmatic response, absent
additional argument, is unprincipled: why should we expect such observations?
How does this actually follow from the fundamental ontology and dynamics?
The recent literature has largely explored two answers. The strategy of Al-
bert, Ney and North has sought to recover the three-dimensional world as an
emergent, higher-level description, in analogy with the general pattern by which
1There is a caveat: ψ and eiθψ make precisely the same predictions and so are empirically
indistinguishable even in principle. The norm in physics is to regard them as the same state
(and thus to accept a slight redundancy in the formalism, which can be eliminated by moving
to a density-operator or ray formulation of quantum mechanics. See Maudlin (2013) for further
consideration of this point in the context of wavefunction realism.
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higher-level ontology emerges from the lower level. The primitive-ontology strat-
egy of Allori et al(2008, cf also Allori 2013) and Maudlin (2013) instead explic-
itly supplements the formalism of quantum mechanics with new, fundamental
three-dimensional ontology (typically this additional ontology is also designed
to solve the measurement problem).
Both strategies agree on this much: that if unsupplemented quantum me-
chanics (with or without some dynamical collapse to solve the measurement
problem) is correct, then we do not fundamentally live in a three-dimensional
world. But (I will argue) this is a misreading of the quantum formalism. On
both technical and conceptual grounds, the move from unmodified quantum
mechanics to an ontology with a single fundamental entity — the wavefunc-
tion — should be rejected.2 Technical, because the account relies on features
of a certain simplified version of quantum mechanics that does not generalise;
conceptual, because even if that simplified version of quantum mechanics is
accepted uncritically, the move to wavefunction realism is unmotivated.
2 The technical case against wavefunction real-
ism
‘Quantum mechanics’, like classical mechanics, is a framework theory: within
that framework, a great many different physical systems can be described, rang-
ing from simple two-state systems, though collections of interacting particles,
through relativistic fields and even (speculatively) including the dynamics of
spacetime itself. The version of quantum mechanics described above, by con-
trast, is a specific theory: to be precise, the theory of a finite number of spinless
particles, interacting through long-range potential forces at nonrelativistic fields.
We might call the latter theory ‘toy nonrelativistic quantum mechanics’, or ‘toy
NRQM’. The ‘toy’ epithet is a little harsh from the point of view of practical
physics — with tweaking, it is widely used in applications — but strictly inter-
preted its scope is very narrow, being insufficient to analyse (for instance) any
process involving light, or any atom more complex than hydrogen. Metaphysical
conclusions based on it can be of value only insofar as they generalise —either
to arbitrary theories falling under the quantum framework or, at a minimum,
to more realistic quantum theories with a wider domain of applicability. This
is not the case, as we will see.3
The first thing to note is that even for toy NRQM, the particular presenta-
tion given above is only one of many mathematically equivalent ways in which
the theory can be formulated. It could equally well, for instance, have been
given in the momentum space representation, where the wavefunction obeys a
quite different differential equation and where |ψ|2 gives the probabilities for
2Monton (2013) and Lewis (2013) also pursue a strategy somewhat along these lines, though
differing significantly in the details (and focussed on the conceptual rather than the technical
issues).
3The quantum mechanics I discuss in this article is in all cases established work and I do
not attempt to give original references.
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momentum, rather than position, measurements. Abstractly speaking, modern
quantum mechanics is formulated on a (usually infinite-dimensional) space of
vectors, called Hilbert space. Wavefunctions are just one way of describing these
abstract vectors (usually called the ‘position representation’); momentum-space
wavefunctions are another, and there are indefinitely many more; physicists shift
between them freely according to which is most helpful in solving a particular
problem. And so wavefunction realism already seems to involve an arbitrary
choice; though, to be fair, in toy NRQM the position representation has a cen-
tral role in the formulation of the theory, so it is not difficult to imagine making
a case for preferring it metaphysically.
As a first move beyond toy NRQM (one sufficient to analyse atomic struc-
ture, though not to treat phenomena involving light), consider that almost all
the particles analysed by quantum mechanics have spin, i. e. intrinsic angular
momentum. A single particle with spin 1/2 (the most common case, and the one
that describes the electron and the proton) is described not by a wavefunction
taking values in the complex numbers C, but by a wavefunction taking values
in a two-dimensional Hilbert space — roughly, the Cartesian product C2 of two
copies of C. That in itself is scarcely problematic — a complex-vector-space-
valued field is scarcely more metaphysically abstruse than a complex-valued
field. But when we consider N particles rather than one, things get — literally
— exponentially more complicated. It does not suffice to give one spin vector
for each point in configuration space, or even N spin vectors. What is required,
rather, is a vector in a 2N dimensional Hilbert space, or put another way, the
wavefunction for N spin-half particles is specified not by one complex number
at each point of configuration space, but by 2N complex numbers. So what
wavefunction realism delivers for, say, a universe of 1080 spin-half particles is
not ‘merely’ a function from a 3× 1080-dimensional space to the complex num-
bers, but a function from a 3 × 1080-dimensional space to a 21080-dimensional
complex vector space. This is a radical departure from the original conception
of wavefunction realism. Or (if we are willing to choose an arbitrary direction
in space, which defines a preferred set of coordinates for the 210
80
-dimensional
space), we can instead see wavefunction realism as delivering not one complex-
valued wavefunction, but 210
80
of them; as metaphysical underdetermination
goes, indeterminacy as to whether there is fundamentally one thing or 210
80
things isn’t bad going.
Now let’s consider dropping the ‘nonrelativistic’ part of toy NRQM, and
considering particles with relative velocities approaching light. There is a well-
formulated (albeit limited) quantum theory of relativistic particles; however,
that theory is formulated without direct reference to the position representation
(it gives, instead, a central role to the momentum representation) and indeed
there is no unproblematic way to define a position representation in relativis-
tic particle physics. See (e.g.) Saunders (1998), Fleming (2000), or Halvorson
(2001) for (fairly technical) details, but in essence, there are two different candi-
dates. One has the property that it’s impossible to define even in principle what
it means for a particle to be sharply localised in a region; the other violates the
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Principle of Relativity.
From the pragmatic point of view of applying relativistic quantum mechan-
ics, this is all harmless: the ‘position’ measurements we make (via cloud cham-
bers et al) are physical processes, and if they were ever precise enough to distin-
guish between different definitions of position (they’re not) then their physical
details would suffice to determine what is in fact being measured. But it leaves
wavefunction realism without a clear definition in the relativistic regime.
This does not exhaust the problems with configuration-space representations
of relativistic quantum mechanics (see Myrvold (2015) for a thorough discus-
sion of relativistic configuration spaces in the context of wavefunction realism).
But in any case these are the least of relativistic particle mechanics’ problems.
In the dawn of quantum mechanics it was recognised that the theory became
inconsistent when interactions between particles were included, unless those in-
teractions were permitted to create or destroy particles. An interim step to
address this leads to variable-particle-number quantum mechanics, in which the
Hilbert space of the theory is the direct sum of the N -particle Hilbert space for
every value of N . Wavefunction realism for a theory of this kind (even setting
aside spin and the ambiguity as to what the position basis is) requires an infinite
number of configuration spaces, and a wavefunction on each, with interactions
coupling the wavefunctions on different spaces — again, the position is radically
transformed.
But even variable-particle-number quantum mechanics, it turned out, failed
to fully realise the lesson of relativistic interactions. That lesson led physics in
due course to quantum field theory, in which particles themselves become emer-
gent, high-level entities: in quantum field theory, the ‘right’ particle description
for a given system depends upon contingent facts about that system, in par-
ticular its energy density. For instance, ‘the’ mass of the electron in quantum
field theory is not some lawlike feature of the theory, but a parameter adjusted
to best fit the details of the physical situation being modelled. More radi-
cally, although popular science often presents the proton and neutron as simple
agglomerations of quarks, a more accurate gloss on quark physics is that the
proton/neutron description is the most perspicuous particle description of the
system at low energies and gives way to the quark description at high energies.
So a fundamental ontology based on the positions of particles looks forlorn in
quantum field theory.
Now, quantum field theory has an analogy to the position representation:
in some cases (‘bosonic’ fields, such as the electromagnetic field), the quantum
state of the field theory can be represented as a wavefunction on a configuration
space — albeit a space in which the points correspond (formally) to entire
instaneous configurations of a field rather than to coordinates of N particles.
Such a space is infinite-dimensional (and mathematically quite badly behaved)
but at least prima facie the wavefunction realist can respond to the challenge of
field theory by being a realist about the field-configuration-space wavefunction.
(See Ney (2013a) for an explicit case for this approach.)
My immediate feeling about this move is: if what is really intended is a
wavefunction on field configuration space, shouldn’t we be discussing that meta-
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physics rather than being distracted by the red herring of wavefunctions on N -
particle configuration space? Granted, the latter has the virtue of being simpler
to talk about, but it has the vice of being inconsistent with our current best
quantum theories, which seems more serious.
But in fact even field-configuration wavefunction realism has severe technical
problems. For a start, as with relativistic quantum mechanics, it is difficult to
reconcile it with relativistic symmetries; indeed, making straightforward sense
of it seems to require a preferred choice of reference frame. (Admittedly, most
advocates of wavefunction realism are sympathetic to resolutions of the quantum
measurement problem which are already in severe tension with relativity, so this
may be a fairly palatable bullet for them to bite.)
More seriously, ‘the’ field configuration basis is often not unambiguously
defined in quantum field theory. Often the same operational content may be
represented through radically different choices of field: this is the phenomenon
of ‘duality’ (for a comparatively elementary example, see Coleman (1985, ch.6)).
So the correct representation for which to express wavefunction realism is pretty
radically underdetermined.
Most seriously of all, I noted that only bosonic field theories can be repre-
sented as wavefunctions on configuration space. Others — the ‘fermionic’ field
theores that represent electrons and quarks (and so are central to our quantum-
mechanical descriptions of ordinary matter) — possess no such representation.4
In conclusion, wavefunction realism seems to rely on features of toy NRQM
which, far from being universal features of any realistic quantum theory, drop
away as soon as we generalise. At least pending very substantial technical work,
we should treat with grave scepticism any suggestion that a metaphysics based
on these features of toy NRQM has any real bearing on the metaphysics of our
Universe.
3 The conceptual case against wavefunction re-
alism
Put aside all these technical objections, and consider the metaphysics of a possi-
ble world where toy NRQM is exactly true.5 Even so, the move to wavefunction
realism is unmotivated.
To illustrate this, consider an example from classical N -particle mechanics.
One natural way to formulate this theory is as follows:
4A technical note: the possibility of a configuration-space representation in field theory
relies on the fact that spacelike separated field operators commute, and so the collection of all
such operators on a spatial hypersurface has a common set of eigenvalues. But in fermionic
fields, spacelike separated operators anticommute. Introduction of Grassman numbers allows
the formal introduction of something analogous to a configuration space representation, but
it is at best unclear whether this has any significance beyond the purely calculational — at
any rate, the burden of proof lies on the wavefunction realist here.
5I avoid saying ‘suppose that we lived in such a world’: it’s pretty clear that toy NRQM,
in which electromagnetic radiation is wholly absent, could not support complex organisms
anything like us.
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• The instantaneous state of the system is represented by N points X1,
. . .XN , in three-dimensional Euclidean space.
• The dynamics is given by the differential equations
mk
d2Xk
dt 2
=
∑
j 6= kFjk(Xj , Xk) (3)
where mk is the mass of the kth particle and Fjk is the force on the kth
particle due to the jth.
It is extremely natural to interpret this as the theory of N particles moving in
space. Notice that essentially all the structure of the world, according to the
theory, is encoded in the mathematical structure of the state — specifically,
in the distances between the various Xk. The actual value of a given Xk, in
isolation, encodes no real information about the system: Euclidean space is
featureless, with no point and no direction distinguished from another. Mathe-
matically speaking, this is because the automorphism group of Euclidean space
is the full three-dimensional group E(3) of translations and rotations: any two
points are related by some translation, any two directions by some rotation.
But there is another way to represent this theory. We can define the configu-
ration space as the product of N copies of Euclidean three-space. Each N -tuple
of points (X1, . . . XN ) now corresponds to a single point in this 3N -dimensional
space, and the N coupled differential equations (3) to a single differential equa-
tion on that space.
If we compare the theory in this formulation to the original formulation, we
observe that:
1. The mathematical state is now completely featureless: a mere point. Any
two states are intrinsically identical.
2. Conversely, the configuration space is much more highly structured than
three-dimensional Euclidean space. Beyond mere dimension it has virtu-
ally nothing in common with 3N -dimensional Euclidean space, and indeed
is a ‘space’ only in the mathematician’s sense, not in any sense based on
a physical analogy with ordinary space.. The latter’s structure is charac-
terised by the 3N -dimensional translation/rotation group E(3N), whereas
the symmetry group of configuration space is simply E(3), the same as
for 3-dimensional Euclidean space.6 In geometrical terms, the coordinate-
free structure of configuration space is most perspicuously specified via
a preferred identification of each point in the former with N points in
3-dimensional Euclidean space.
The move to configuration space has encoded all salient features of the sys-
tem via the position of a maximally simple state (a single point) in a highly
structured space, rather than via an intrinsically complex state (an Ntuple of
points) located in a much less structured space. There’s nothing wrong with
6Lewis (2013) explores this point further in his discussion of wavefunction realism.
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this: it’s a standard move in theoretical physics. Indeed, it’s a completely gen-
eral move: a state-space formalism, where all states are intrinsically identical
and all structural features of the world are encoded in a state’s location in a
highly structured state space, can be straightforwardly defined for pretty much
any dynamical theory.
I draw two morals:
1. When physical theories are presented to us as formulated on spaces with
much more structure than Euclidean space, we should not rush to interpret
them as physical spaces, rather than as mathematical devices to encode
information about the physical state.
2. Conversely, when a state is represented mathematically by a comparatively
simple entity living in a highly structured space, we should not rush to
assume that the physical world is comparably simple. Indeed, we should
not rush to assume a one-to-one correspondence between mathematical
states and physical entities: doing so in the case of classical mechanics
would lead us to assume there is one fundamental entity, not N .
What then of quantum mechanics? The most direct analogue of the classical
discussion is the Hilbert-space formulation of quantum theory, in which states
are normalised vectors. Any two vectors are intrinsically identical (being mere
lines); all the physical information about a system is encoded in the location of
that vector in Hilbert space. As such, it would be naive in the extreme to be
a “Hilbert-space-vector realist’: to reify Hilbert space, and take it as analogous
to physical space.
North (2013), in making the case for wavefunction realism, actually dis-
cusses Hilbert-space-vector realism, and of course rejects it, but her reasons are
instructive: she writes that “The Hilbert space formulation seems to contain too
little structure from which to construct a picture of the world as we experience
it. Hilbert space does not support an objective, structural distinction between
positions and other physical properties, like spin, in the way that the wavefunc-
tions space does”. But of course the Hilbert space of any particular quantum
theory does indeed have enough structure to do so: any particular quantum
theory is given not by a bare, unstructured Hilbert space but by that space
together with an algebra of preferred observables (to which I return later). If
it were not so structured, Hilbert-space quantum mechanics would be pragmat-
ically unsuited to quantum mechanics, which manifestly is not the case. The
reason to reject Hilbert-space-vector realism, rather, is that the space on which
the Hilbert space vector is defined is much too highly structured to be taken as
analogous to physical space: it is a state space, just as configuration space is.
The wavefunction formulation of quantum mechanics lies intermediate be-
tween the elementary formulation of classical mechanics (in which essentially all
the physical structure is coded in the intrinsic properties of the state, and in
which the space of the state is largely featureless) and the state-space formu-
lations of classical and quantum mechanics (in which all the world’s structure
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is coded via the position of the state). The wavefunction is far from feature-
less — a given wavefunction might be extremely highly structured — but two
wavefunctions that are related by (say) an arbitrary translation or rotation on
configuration space will describe radically different physics, because configura-
tion space is also highly structured. Indeed, the structure of the wavefunction
only serves to encode quantum-mechanical facts about a system. States corre-
sponding to fully classical states of affairs have trivial, wave-packet wavefunc-
tions, and again everything that distinguishes one classical state from another
is encoded by the location of that wave-packet.
So reading wavefunction realism from the existence of the configuration-
space representation of quantum mechanics seems unmotivated, for largely the
same reasons as reading Hilbert-space-vector realism from the vector represen-
tation of quantum mechanics. In both cases, the combination of the intrinsic
and locational features of the state serves to encode all the physical structure
of the system in question, but there is no reason to think that the formalism
transparently displays anything like the appropriate metaphysical description
of the system.
So what is “the appropriate metaphysical description”? Here’s one possibil-
ity: an N -particle quantum state is uniquely specified by assigning a complex
number to every N -tuple of points of space. We could perfectly well interpret
these complex numbers as relational properties of N -tuples of spatial points,
irreducible to monadic properties of individual points; that’s a highly nonlo-
cal ontology, but the phenomenology of entanglement is also highly nonlocal so
that looks like a feature, not a bug. I don’t want to claim that this is the clear
best metaphysical description of quantum mechanics — I seriously doubt that
it is, given the technical criticisms of the previous section — but it will do as
an existence proof that there are ontologies for quantum mechanics that don’t
regard the highly-structured configuration space as a physical space.
I have argued so far that there is no good case for simply reading off wave-
function realism from the quantum formalism. But can it be argued for as the
best way to think of quantum ontology? (Here I continue to put aside purely
technical objections.) North attempts to do so, but her argument is that we
should prefer that ontology which has just the right level of structure to support
physics, and we have seen that this fails to distinguish between wavefunction
realism, Hilbert-space-vector realism and the nonlocal, three-dimensional-space-
based ontology of complex N -point relations — all are structurally isomorphic,
but they are sharply different metaphysically.7
Ney (this volume) argues for wavefunction realism on the grounds that it
delivers an ontology that is both separable and local: on wavefunction realism,
the state of the whole system is given by the separate wavefunction values at
each point of configuration space, and the dynamics are given by configuration-
space-local equations.
7Or maybe not. Those sympathetic to the ontic structural realism of Ladyman and Ross
(2007), Saunders (2003) et al — like me — might be sceptical that there is a true distinction
here. But for the purposes of this essay I assume a more straightforward metaphysics, in
keeping with the presumptions of most advocates of wavefunction realism.
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The case that wavefunction realism preserves locality is somewhat unclear
to me. It’s true that the Schro¨dinger equation is configuration-space local, but
if wavefunction collapse is included (as in the GRW theory) then it is nonlocal
even on configuration space — and if it isn’t, then we are effectively assuming
the Everett interpretation, which has local dynamics even on more explicitly
spatiotemporal formulations (Wallace 2012, ch.8). The case for separability
is considerably clearer, albeit there are separable formulations of Everettian
quantum mechanics on spacetime, notably that given by Deutsch and Hayden
(2000; cf discussion in Wallace and Timpson 2010).
But in any case, we need a positive argument for why separability and lo-
cality are desirable features for our ontology. And as Ney herself persuasively
argues, standard arguments for wanting these features really concern separabil-
ity and locality in three-dimensional space (fundamental or emergent), and not
separability or locality in a high-dimensional but phenomenologically distant
fundamental space. She concludes that “[t]he case for a separable and local
metaphysics for quantum mechanics then comes from more broadly philosoph-
ical considerations, special relativity, perhaps brute intuition, and additionally
considerations of what provides a more coherent and stable picture.”
Of these, I will pass over the “broadly philosophical considerations” and
“considerations of what provides a more coherent and stable picture”: ulti-
mately they are considerations to assess when comparing wavefunction realism
to other concrete ontological proposals, and those lie outside the scope of this
article. The appeal to brute intuition seems problematic for reasons that Ney
herself again provides: why expect our intuitive faculties, evolved as they are for
the emergent classical world, to track truth about fundamental metaphysics?
A conflict between special relativity and alternatives to wavefunction realism
would indeed be a strong reason in favour of the position, but I’m unsure how
the conflict is supposed to go. In philosophy of spacetime, ‘compatibility with
relativity’ usually means that the theory is formulated on Minkowski spacetime
with no additional structure; in mainstream physics, it more usually means that
the theory has the Lorentz group as a symmetry group. But neither definition
favours wavefunction realism over alternatives. As for the former: the spacetime
of wavefunction realism (configuration space × time) is not Minkowski space-
time, and in an important sense is explicitly nonrelativistic, incorporating as it
does a preferred sense of simultaneity (to specify a configuration is to specify the
locations of several particles at the same time, and the formal features required
to define the relation between configuration space and Minkowski spacetime
continue to include this preferred simultaneity even as the interpretation of
‘configuration’ space changes. As for the latter: the equations of a theory have
the same (dynamical) symmetry group however they are interpreted metaphys-
ically, and so the question of whether they are Lorentz-covariant is independent
of wavefunction realism. (The answer? ‘Yes’ for the Everett interpretation; ‘No’
for most proposed relativistic generalisations of Bohmian mechanics; ‘Unclear’
in the case of dynamical-collapse theories). If there is any further sense in which
relativity favours wavefunction realism, it has not yet been developed.
I conclude that even if the particular features of toy NRQM that permit
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wavefunction realism to be formulated could be found in more sophisticated and
realistic quantum theories, wavefunction realism would not be a well-motivated
approach to the ontology of quantum theory: its supposed advantages are un-
persuasive and the highly structured ‘space’ on which it is defined is not properly
analogous to ordinary physical space.
4 Epilogue: spacetime in quantum theory
So what is the correct ontology of quantum theory?
I don’t know. The advocates of wavefunction realism certainly deserve credit
for recognising that there is a significant metaphysical question to be answered
here, even if their proposed answer falls short: the ill-defined metaphysics of
‘eigenvector-eigenvalue links’ and ‘indefinite properties’ look unlikely to survive
in any realist solution to the quantum measurement problem. Chris Timpson
and I sketch one possibility in Wallace and Timpson (2010), and I review others
in Wallace (2012, ch.8), but these are, at best, essays in the craft; more generally,
I suspect that looking for ‘the’ ontology of a framework theory is a category
error (Wallace 2017) and that we would do better to reformulate the question
in terms of the ontology of specific quantum theories, such as the standard
model of particle physics (and also to recognise that these are unlikely to be
fundamental theories, so that hopes to learn about fundamental ontology from
those theories are probably vain).
However, one striking theme in the formalism of pretty much every empiri-
cally successful specific quantum theory I know is that space (or rather, space-
time) concepts play a central role. In particle mechanics, the theory is normally
defined in terms of the spacetime symmetry group (Galilean for nonrelativis-
tic theories, Poincare´ for relativistic): indeed, a one-particle quantum theory is
frequently defined as an irreducible representation of the appropriate spacetime
symmetry group (whatever the metaphysical status of that approach). In quan-
tum field theory, the connection is significantly tighter: the theory’s structure
is specified via operator-valued fields, i. e. maps from spacetime points into the
algebra of operators on Hilbert space. So dynamical quantities get their oper-
ational significance at least partly via their association with spacetime points.
Indeed, at least according to the ‘algebraic’ formulation of quantum field theory,
the operational significance of dynamical quantities is exhausted by their space-
time associations: a quantum field theory, in the algebraic setup, is specified
completely by a map from spacetime regions to the algebra of dynamical vari-
ables associated to each region, with no further specification of which operator in
a region corresponds to which physical value. Spacetime is thus mathematically
required in the formulation of a quantum field theory.
Does this mean that spacetime is fundamental? It is too early to tell. Quan-
tum field theories (which presume a fixed, background spacetime) must sooner
or later give way to some quantum theory of gravity, and we do not yet have
that theory, so metaphysical speculation about spacetime’s status in it is prob-
ably premature. What we can say is that spacetime plays a fundamental, non-
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derivative role in our current best quantum theories, and so extant quantum
physics gives no reason at all to expect its elimination.
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